

Perfectionist's Guide To

# TLS Optimizations & HTTP Headers



Ayesh Karunaratne | <https://ayesh.me/talk/TLS-HTTP-Headers>





How do you mail a parcel  
securely and fast?



How do you mail a parcel  
securely and fast?


How do you mail a parcel  
**securely** and **fast**?




How do you mail a parcel  
**securely** and **fast**?



How do you mail a parcel  
**securely** and **fast**?



# How do you mail a parcel **securely** and fast?





# How do **serve** web sites **securely** and fast?

HTTPS  
(TLS/SSL)

HTTP  
Headers

Perfectionist's Guide to  
**HTTPS Optimizations &  
HTTP Headers**

Hello

Здравейте





# Ayesh Karunaratne

Freelance Software Developer, Security Researcher, Full-time traveler

 Kandy, Sri Lanka - Everywhere

 <https://ayesh.me>


 Ayesh


 @Ayeshlive

 Ayesh

Perfectionist's Guide to  
**HTTPS Optimizations &  
HTTP Headers**


# How do we serve web sites securely and fast?






- Authentication** The server is what it says it is
- Private** Nobody can see what is being transferred
- Untampered** Nobody can change what is being transferred
- Authorization** Who can access this data
- Behavior** How the page is allowed to behave
- Authenticity** How to validate authenticity of the data











## Certificate Optimizations

- Stronger certificate keys
- Faster certificate keys
- Smaller certificates

# Encryption and Handshake Optimizations

- Stronger cryptographic strength
- Faster encryption algorithms
- Better protocols





## Validation Optimizations

- Eliminate the need for them with short-lived certificates
- Staple OCSP information
- Embed Certificate Transparency Info

# Certificate Optimizations

# Certificate Optimizations



## RSA

This certificate authenticates  
example.com, [www.example.com](http://www.example.com)

**Valid from**  
15 Jan 2019 to 15 Apr 2019

**Public key algorithm**  
RSA-2048 bits

**Public key**  
...c2 04 ec f8 8c ee 04 ...

# Certificate Optimizations

## RSA

## ECC



This certificate authenticates  
example.com, [www.example.com](http://www.example.com)

This certificate authenticates  
example.com, [www.example.com](http://www.example.com)

**Valid from**  
15 Jan 2019 to 15 Apr 2019

**Valid from**  
15 Jan 2019 to 15 Apr 2019

**Public key algorithm**  
RSA-2048 bits

**Public key algorithm**  
prime256v1: 256 bits

**Public key**  
...c2 04 ec f8 8c ee 04 ...  
2048 bits

**Public key**  
...04 f1 a3 ff 46 e9 ...  
256 bits



# Certificate Optimizations

## RSA

## ECC



This certificate authenticates  
example.com, [www.example.com](http://www.example.com)

This certificate authenticates  
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RSA-2048 bits

Public key algorithm  
prime256v1: 256 bits

Public key  
...c2 04 ec f8 8c ee 04 ...  
2048 bits

Public key  
...04 f1 a3 ff 46 e9 ...  
256 bits



# Certificate Optimizations

openssl speed

<b>RSA</b>	2048 bit keys	1002.6 sign/sec	33885 verify/sec
	4096 bit keys	162 sign/sec	10860 verify/sec
<b>ECC</b>	256 bit keys	13275.6 sign/sec	6801.1 verify/sec
	384 bit keys	2572.4 sign/sec	658.1 verify/sec



# Certificate Optimizations

Serve RSA + ECC certificates from the web server



```
<VirtualHost *:443>
  SSLEngine on
  ...
  SSLCertificateFile /path/to/rsa.pem
  SSLCertificateKeyFile /path/to/rsa.key.pem

  SSLCertificateFile /path/to/ecc.pem
  SSLCertificateKeyFile /path/to/ecc.key.pem
  ...
</VirtualHost>
```



```
server {
  ssl_certificate /path/to/rsa.pem;
  ssl_certificate_key /path/to/rsa.key.pem;

  ssl_certificate /path/to/ecc.key.pem
  ssl_certificate_key /path/to/ecc.key.pem
}
```

# Encryption and Handshake Optimizations

# Encryption and Handshake Optimizations

## Cipher Suites


A set of algorithms that help secure a network connection that uses Transport Layer Security

## TLS Versions

A well-defined protocol that defines cipher suites and other encryption mechanisms that servers and user agents agree to.

# Encryption and Handshake Optimizations

## Cipher Suites



Protocols

Transport Layer Security

# Encryption and Handshake Optimizations

## Cipher Suites

### Insecure

TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA  
TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA  
TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256  
TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_RC4128\_SHA  
TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_3DES\_CBC\_SHA  
TLS\_DH\_anon\_WITH\_CAMELLIA\_256\_CBC\_SHA  
TLS\_DH\_anon\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA  
TLS\_CK\_RC4\_64\_WITH\_MD5  
TLS\_DH\_anon\_EXPORT\_WITHDES40\_CBC\_CBC\_SHA  
....

Weak MAC, no forward-secrecy, broken encryption

### Secure and Faster

TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256  
TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384  
TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_CHACHA20\_POLY1305\_SHA256  
TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256  
TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384  
....

Forward-secrecy, low-cost encryption, hardware-acceleration

# Encryption and Handshake Optimizations

## Cipher Suites

Hostname:

Do not show the results on the boards

<https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/index.html>

# Encryption and Handshake Optimizations

## Cipher Suites



### Cipher Suites

#### # TLS 1.3 (suites in server-preferred order)

TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0x1303)	ECDH x25519 (eq. 3072 bits RSA) FS	256
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x1301)	ECDH x25519 (eq. 3072 bits RSA) FS	128
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x1302)	ECDH x25519 (eq. 3072 bits RSA) FS	256


#### # TLS 1.2 (suites in server-preferred order)

TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02b)	ECDH x25519 (eq. 3072 bits RSA) FS	128
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02f)	ECDH x25519 (eq. 3072 bits RSA) FS	128
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc02c)	ECDH x25519 (eq. 3072 bits RSA) FS	256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc030)	ECDH x25519 (eq. 3072 bits RSA) FS	256
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xcca9)	ECDH x25519 (eq. 3072 bits RSA) FS	256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xcca8)	ECDH x25519 (eq. 3072 bits RSA) FS	256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x9e)	DH 2048 bits FS	128
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x9f)	DH 2048 bits FS	256

<https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/index.html>

# Encryption and Handshake Optimizations

## Cipher Suites



**Cipher Suites**

# TLS 1.2 (suites in server-preferred order)

TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc030)	ECDH secp256r1 (eq. 3072 bits RSA) FS	256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xc028)	ECDH secp256r1 (eq. 3072 bits RSA) FS <b>WEAK</b>	256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc014)	ECDH secp256r1 (eq. 3072 bits RSA) FS <b>WEAK</b>	256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x9f)	DH 2048 bits FS	256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 (0x6b)	DH 2048 bits FS <b>WEAK</b>	256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x39)	DH 2048 bits FS <b>WEAK</b>	256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA (0x88)	DH 2048 bits FS <b>WEAK</b>	256
TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc019)	<b>INSECURE</b>	256
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xa7)	<b>INSECURE</b>	256
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 (0x6d)	<b>INSECURE</b>	256
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x3a)	<b>INSECURE</b>	256
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA (0x89)	<b>INSECURE</b>	256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x9d)	<b>WEAK</b>	256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 (0x3d)	<b>WEAK</b>	256

<https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/index.html>



# Encryption and Handshake Optimizations

## Cipher Suites



# SSL Configuration Generator

### Server Software

- Apache
- AWS ALB
- AWS ELB
- Caddy
- Dovecot
- Exim
- Golang
- HAProxy
- lighttpd
- MySQL
- nginx
- Oracle HTTP
- Postfix
- PostgreSQL
- ProFTPD
- Traefik

### Mozilla Configuration

- Modern  
Services with clients that support TLS 1.3 and don't need backward compatibility
- Intermediate  
General-purpose servers with a variety of clients, recommended for almost all systems
- Old  
Compatible with a number of very old clients, and should be used only as a last resort

### Environment

Server Version	1.17.0
OpenSSL Version	1.1.1c

### Miscellaneous

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	HTTP Strict Transport Security This also redirects to HTTPS, if possible
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	OCSP Stapling

<https://ssl-config.mozilla.org/>

# Encryption and Handshake Optimizations

## Cipher Suites



```
SSLCipherSuite ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-  
RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-  
SHA384:ECDHE-RSA ...
```




```
server {  
    ssl_ciphers ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-  
RSA-AES128-  
}
```

# Encryption and Handshake Optimizations

## TLS Versions

1995    1996    1999    2006    2008    2011    2015    2018    2020



Protocols

Transport Layer Security

# Encryption and Handshake Optimizations

## TLS Versions



SSLProtocol **all -SSLv3 -TLSv1 -TLSv1.1**

<https://ayesh.me/TLSv1.3-Apache>



```
server {  
    ssl_protocols TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3  
}
```

# Certificate Validation

# Certificate Validation

1. Certificate Authority is authorized to issue certificates
2. Certificate is valid and not revoked
3. Certificate Authorities are accounted for the certificates they issue

# Certificate Validation


Certificate Authority is authorized to issue certificates

## DNS CAA records

secosday.eu	0 issue "letsencrypt.org"	86400
secosday.eu	0 issuewild ";"	86400
secosday.eu	0 iodef "mailto:ayesh@ayesh.me"	86400

# Certificate Validation

Certificate is valid and not revoked




- Additional network connection overhead
- Soft-fail by design, due to unreliable networking and CA servers




# Certificate Validation

Certificate is valid and not revoked



# Certificate Validation

Certificate is valid and not revoked



# Certificate Validation

Certificate is valid and not revoked



**This certificate authenticates**  
example.com, [www.example.com](http://www.example.com)

**Valid from**  
15 Jan 2019 to 15 Apr 2019

**Public key algorithm**  
prime256v1: 256 bits

**Public key**  
...04 f1 a3 ff 46 e9 ...  
256 bits

**Must-Staple**

# Certificate Validation

Certificate Authorities are accounted for the certificates they issue

A “trusted” certificate authority can issue a certificate for any domain name

There are over 200 “trusted” CA’s trusted in almost every system

We have no way to know if a CA issued a rogue certificate

# Certificate Validation



Certificate Authorities are accounted for the certificates they issue

## Certificate Authority Wall of Shame



# Certificate Validation

Certificate Authorities are accounted for the certificates they issue



Append-only  
Cannot remove items  
Submit a pre-certificate and get Signed Certificate Timestamp

# Certificate Optimizations

- Use modern Elliptic Curve Cryptography certificates
- Serve RSA + ECC certificates

# Encryption and Handshake Optimizations

- Do not use obsolete and old encryption and authentication mechanisms (RC4, 3DES, MD5, SHA1)
- Use mobile-friendly and fast encryption (CHACHA20-POLY1305, AES-GCM)
- Add TLS 1.3 support, DROP versions < 1.2

# Certificate Validation

- DNS CAA records to indicate Certificate Authority Authorization
- Certificate Transparency, and SCT embedded in the certificate
- OCSP stapling and must-staple extension

# **Application Layer Security**



## An HTTP Request



```
GET /index.html  
Host: example.com  
Accept: text/html
```

```
HTTP 2.0 200 OK  
Server: Apache  
Content-Type: text/html
```





HTTP 2.0 200 OK

**Server:** Apache

**Content-Type:** text/html

**Strict-Transport-Security:** max-age=31536000;includeSubDomains;preload

**x-Frame-Options:** deny

**X-Content-Type-Options:** nosniff

**Feature-Policy:** accelerometer 'none';camera 'none'

**Content-Security-Policy:** default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'

**Referrer-Policy:** no-referrer

# Set Custom Headers




Header always set *name* "vaLue"



ddd\_header *name* "vaLue"

# HTTP Strict-Transport-Security (HSTS)

Tells the browser to always connect over HTTPS (not plain HTTP), and remember this for a specified amount of time



Reference: <https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security>  
<https://hstspreload.org>

# X-Frame-Options

Can this page be embedded in an iframe

X-Frame-Options: deny

No other web page can embed this page in an iframe

X-Frame-Options: sameorigin

Only pages of same origin can embed this page in an iframe

Reference: <https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/X-Frame-Options>

# X-Content-Type-Options

Do not sniff and try to guess the type of the content I'm about to send.

**X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff**

Reference: <https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options>

# Referrer-Policy

Control the HTTP Referrer header sent for page assets

**Referrer-Policy:** `no-referrer`

Do not send any header at all

**Referrer-Policy:** `no-referrer`

**Referrer-Policy:** `no-referrer-when-downgrade`

**Referrer-Policy:** `origin`

**Referrer-Policy:** `origin-when-cross-origin`

**Referrer-Policy:** `same-origin`

**Referrer-Policy:** `strict-origin`

**Referrer-Policy:** `strict-origin-when-cross-origin`

**Referrer-Policy:** `unsafe-url`

Reference: <https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Referrer-Policy>

# Feature-Policy

Allow or deny the usage of features in web page and child iframes

Feature-Policy: `<directive>` `<allowlist>`

Feature that you want to control

Deny, or white-list origins that can use the feature

- ambient-light-sensor
- autoplay
- accelerometer
- battery
- camera
- encrypted-media
- full-screen
- geolocation

- microphone
- payment
- picture-in-picture
- speaker
- sync-hxr
- webauthn

- \* : Allow all hosts
- 'none' : Disable this feature
- 'self' : Allow same origin URL only
- example.com: Allow example.com only.

Reference: <https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Feature-Policy>



# Feature-Policy

Allow or deny the usage of features in web page and child iframes

```
Feature-Policy: camera none, webauthn 'self', speaker 'self' example.com
```

Disable the camera feature entirely

Origin domain can use webauthn, but nobody else

Origin domain and example.com can use speaker

Reference: <https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Feature-Policy>

# Content-Security-Policy

Deny or whitelist which sources the page contents can communicate with, connect to, and fetch resources from  
Toggle or control certain types of security features

Content-Security-Policy: `<directive>` `<allowlist>`

Type of asset, or connection

Deny, or white-list origins that perform said connections

- `img-src`
- `media-src`
- `script-src`
- `style-src`
- `font-src`
- `form-actions`
- `navigate-to`
- ...
- `block-all-mixed-content`
- `upgrade-insecure-requests`

- `*` : Allow all hosts
- `'none'` : Disable all connections
- `'self'` : Allow same origin URL only
- `example.com:` Allow `example.com` only.

Reference: <https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CSP>  
<https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy>

# Content-Security-Policy

Deny or whitelist which sources the page contents can communicate with, connect to, and fetch resources from  
Toggle or control certain types of security features

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' cdn.example.com.com;  
object-src 'self' i.visalogy.com; style-src 'self' i.visalogy.com; img-src 'self'  
i.visalogy.com;
```

Use this rule for every connection type not mentioned here

Only allow scripts from origin URL and cdn.example.com only

Only allow images from origin URL

Reference: <https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CSP>  
<https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy>

# **Further Resources**

# Further Resources

- <https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/>
- <https://ssl-config.mozilla.org/>
- <https://cipherli.st/>
- <https://www.immuniweb.com/websec/>
- <https://www.immuniweb.com/ssl/>

# Questions?

No question is too small.


**@Ayeshlive**     [ayesh@ayesh.me](mailto:ayesh@ayesh.me)

<https://ayesh.me/talk/TLS-HTTP-Headers>

arigatô paldies dziękuję Ďakujem tak  
diolch dankie děkuji mahalo kop khun  
감사합니다 хвала shukran köszönöm  
a dank gràcies ngiyabonga tänan Баярлалаа dhanyavād  
Дякую ευχαριστώ **THANK YOU** Благодарам  
спасибо благодаря tack  
grazie Mh'gōi Dank u Благодаря ти gracias  
mulțumesc тәккәчи аңиү nandri הודת.  
danke teşekkür ederim choukrane faleminderit Xièxiè  
Հնրհապալութիւն obrigado kiitos  
terima kasih hvala grazzi

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